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about the real conditions of experience yield it, unless adequate recognition be first of all given to the fact that the experience which is the subject-matter of philosophy is not merely a sensuous and thinking, but also a moral, experience."

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Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy. By NORMAN SMITH. London, Macmillan & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1902. — pp. xiv, 276.

This compact and closely reasoned volume is a real contribution to the history of modern philosophy. The author has studied the literature of his subject in an unusually thorough manner, and has worked over the material thus gained in a very independent spirit. The size of the book is no indication of its scope or of the amount of research which it involves. After stating and criticising in detail the philosophy of Descartes, Mr. Smith proceeds to an examination of the Cartesian principles imbedded in the systems of Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, and Berkeley. He then gives Hume's criticism of these principles, and finally contrasts the Cartesian philosophy with the Kantian point of view. Naturally, the results are presented in a very condensed way, and this renders it difficult to give an adequate survey of the ground covered. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with a statement of the general course of the argument.

At the outset an important point is emphasized, namely, the lack of connection between the physics and the metaphysics of Descartes. "In a more adequate manner than even Galileo or Bacon, Descartes formulated the methods and defined the ideals of modern science. His metaphysical teaching, however, is perverted by principles wholly at variance with his own positive scientific views . . . and remains in essentials scholastic in conception" (pp. v, vi). Thus, in his metaphysics, he regards motion as a mode of matter, while in his physics he not only conceives the two as distinct in nature and origin, but anticipates modern science by viewing matter as the mere vehicle of motion.

After making this preliminary observation, the author goes on to show that the form which Descartes's philosophy assumed is conditioned by the fact that a new view of the self and of nature had grown up since the time of Aristotle. "The soul, Aristotle teaches, realizes itself in and through the body. The material and the immaterial are two aspects involved in all natural existences and are separable only

by abstraction (p. 1). Owing to the combined influence of Stoicism and Christianity, however, these aspects of reality came to be regarded as absolute opposites. Descartes accepts without question this new view of the relation between matter and mind. The result of this dualistic standpoint is the doctrine of representative perception. "The self can know nothing but its own states, and only indirectly by an inference from them establish the existence of any other being. Ideas are regarded as the objects of mind and as exact copies of what exists outside mind" (p. 14). From this point of view, the sole immediate certainty is knowledge of our own existence. Clearly, then, the *cogito ergo sum* is not the really ultimate element in Descartes's system. It is "simply one consequence of the doctrine of representative perception which is itself a consequence of his dualistic starting point" (p. 14).

Further, the *cogito ergo sum* does not prove the continued existence of the self beyond the present moment. Still less does it establish the existence of the self as a simple indivisible substance. "Descartes in so arguing really interprets his 'ultimate' principle in accordance with an assumed principle yet more ultimate, the principle namely which he states explicitly in his *Principles* 'that to nothing no affections or qualities belong.' Without proof he assumes thought to be a quality, and, therefore, in accordance with that principle, to imply a substance or self" (p. 50).

Descartes is thus led to the theory of representative perception by his dualism, though his new and scientific view of the material world throws special difficulties in the way of such a doctrine (p. 15). His conception of spirit, though professedly based on immediate experience, is really derived from an interpretation of that experience in the light of certain scholastic principles (p. 115). His rationalism, the third element in his system, is a result of his mathematical studies.

The characteristic of the mathematical method, according to Descartes, is its certainty, and this certainty is due to the fact that mathematics starts with truths which are simple and self-evident. Since there can be but one method of attaining truth, philosophy must likewise begin with simple ultimate truths and deduce everything from them. Though deductive, however, the true method is not syllogistic. It is in Intuition, and not in the syllogism, that our knowledge develops. "Intuition is not a fitting together of premises but a dialectic. Given certain data, they produce out of themselves a further truth" (p. 34). Particular truths do not require to be deduced from universal axioms; like the latter they are themselves

known by intuition. The limits of our knowledge, therefore, are determined by the simple truths we possess, their possible fruitfulness, and their adequacy to the explanation of the real. In the *Regulæ* and the *Principles*, Descartes gives the same enumeration of these simple truths, namely, figure, extension, motion, etc. ; knowledge, doubt, ignorance, volition, and the like ; existence, duration, unity. Since these conceptions are 'simple natures,' we cannot know them at all without knowing them completely. They are of course not derived from sense perception, and are wholly distinct from them in nature. They are innate ideas directly implanted in the mind by God.

If we examine these innate ideas, however, we find that they are all abstract conceptions, and simple only so long as they remain abstract. Hence, when Descartes maintains that all knowledge is derived from these abstract conceptions taken by themselves, "he falls back into that rationalistic view of knowledge which he criticises so excellently in his attack on the syllogism" (p. 39). This rationalistic theory which Descartes eventually adopts can be understood only in the light of the scholastic doctrine of essence. According to that doctrine each substance has an essence peculiar to itself which determines all its properties. If we know the essence at all we know it completely, and can deduce all the properties which flow from it. This implies, of course, that the connection of ideas is the same as that of things. Descartes accepts this view with all its implications. His criterion of truth means that what is inseparable in thought is inseparable in the real, and, further, that when the mind can perceive no connection between ideas, there is no connection between the existences corresponding to the ideas.

This theory of knowledge accounts for the Occasionalism implicit in Descartes's metaphysics. Since, as a matter of fact, the particularity and variety of the real cannot be deduced from isolated abstract conceptions, Descartes is forced at every turn to explain the concrete content of the world by reference to the will of God. "The continued reference to God for explanation of finite phenomena is no admission of ignorance of the true explanation, but is always based on the certain and absolute knowledge that they are due neither to mind nor to matter, and that, therefore, so far as they have any reality they must be wholly dependent on what is outside both. Since mind and body are in thought completely transparent to us, each being exhaustively known in conception, where no necessary connection is visible between them, or between either of them and what is conjoined with it in experience, there can be none, and such conjunction as is vouched

for by experience must be regarded as external and contingent'' (pp. 62, 63). In his controversy with More, Descartes explicitly adopts the Occasionalistic theory. "He has no liking, however, for the Occasionalism into which he is entrapped by his Rationalism," and in his published works continues to speak as if bodies transmit motion by impact, as if mind and body interact in sense-perception and in volition (pp. 77, 79).

The searching examination to which the system of Descartes is subjected in the first three chapters of the book enables the author to state in a concise and telling way the relation between the Cartesian philosophy and the systems of Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, and Berkeley. Mr. Smith's treatment of Locke's theory of knowledge is especially significant. He shows that Locke clings to the rationalistic view of knowledge, though his analysis of the conceptions of substance and essence force him to the conclusion that deductive knowledge is not possible where real existence is concerned. We do not know the substance or essence of things; we simply assume that there is something which supports the qualities revealed to us by experience, and the nature of that 'something' is entirely unknown to us. We can deduce nothing, therefore, in regard to the nature of particular substances; all that we know in reference to them comes from experience. "Yet Locke remains so much under Descartes's influence that he goes to the extreme of holding that this empirical knowledge is not entitled to the name of knowledge at all, and that sense experience can perform no function in scientific knowledge" (p. 210). We have knowledge in the true sense of the word in the case of mathematics and morals alone, for here we are dealing with 'modes,' *i. e.*, with objects made by the mind itself and therefore known through and through. There are, then, Mr. Smith concludes, good reasons for maintaining that Locke is a rationalist at heart, and that "his sensationalism is but externally tagged on to his rationalism."

It seems to me that there are good grounds for revising the conventional estimate of Locke; but it is not so clear that we must necessarily regard his 'empiricism' as externally attached to his rationalism. His final position in the fourth book of the *Essay* is perfectly consistent and intelligible. It is quite proper for a rationalist to maintain that, while true knowledge is deductive, experience, as a matter of fact, is all that we have in most cases. The two statements taken together simply amount to a rationalistic determination of the limits of knowledge. Why should we not interpret the 'empirical' doctrine of the second book in the light of this final utterance? If we

read the second book in connection with the others, if, in short, we read the work as a whole, it is possible to maintain that the *Essay* represents the development in Locke's mind of the view, ultimately announced in the last book, which brings the various aspects of his system into intelligible relation with one another.

The chapters on Hume and Kant show how the different elements of the Cartesian philosophy are destroyed by criticism and finally give place to a more adequate view of knowledge and reality. Hume's criticism of the causal relation refutes the fundamental assumption of Cartesian rationalism, namely, the identification of causation with explanation. His analysis of the self destroys the false spiritualism of Descartes. It must be noted, however, that, while Hume starts with a theory of the ultimate constituents of experience to construct experience, Kant starts from our actual consciousness to discover its conditions. "Hume's method is *a priori* and dogmatic, and Kant's alone the truly empirical" (p. 257). Kant's transcendental method "is simply the hypothetical method of physical science applied to the explanation of knowledge" (p. 256). Kant, however, takes as the fact to be explained, not experience in all its multiplicity, but the simplest act of knowledge, that which is involved in all knowledge whatsoever, namely, the consciousness of time. "That we possess such consciousness has never been denied by any philosopher, and is therefore the really indubitable fact by the analysis of which Descartes ought to have started."

The main defect of Mr. Smith's book is that he has condensed too much material into the space he allows himself. In the later chapters this does not destroy the lucidity of the exposition, but in the early chapters, where the foundation of the whole is laid, the case is somewhat different. If the author had, in the first part of the book, developed some of his points more fully, and at the same time rearranged his material so that each element of Descartes's system received more continuous treatment, the progress of his argument would have been much clearer. There is, for instance, no adequate account of Descartes's 'spiritualism,' and the reader is left to put things together for himself out of various scattered references. As it is, however, the book has unusual merit. The more one studies it, the more one is convinced that the author has grasped the really constitutive principles of modern philosophy, and has indicated their true relations and historical interactions. He has thus thrown new light on some of the most obscure questions in the history of philosophy. In short, he has succeeded in doing well a task well worth doing.